The list of Allen's distinctions, accomplishments, and contributions is long. Where should one begin? Reasonable people will differ, but I would point first to his two-year stint as Chairman of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1961-63). Attorney General Robert Kennedy put it well when he said of the Allen Report (as it has come to be called) that its "comprehensive study and challenging recommendations" "honor[] the finest traditions of our profession." ' The Allen Report and its accompanying draft of proposed legislation led to the much-needed Criminal Justice Act of 1964.
3 More generaly, and more important, the Report significantly affected our way of thinking about the obligations of "equal justice" and the problems faced by criminal defendants of limited means.
Frank Allen is a thinker and a doer. He is also a splendid writer. Again, reasonable people will differ, but I think his best writing is to be found in the Allen Report. The Report underscored that the elimination, or at least the minimization, of the influence of poverty in the administration of criminal justice "involves more than an expression of humanitarian sentiment or the extension of public charity." ' 4 No one has ever said it better:
[G]overnmental obligation to deal effectively with problems of poverty in the administration of criminal justice does not rest or depend upon some hypothetical obligation of government to indulge in acts of public charity. It does not presuppose a general commitment on the part of the federal government to relieve impoverished persons of the consequences of limited means, whenever or however manifested.... The obligation of government in the criminal cases rests on wholly different considerations and reflects principles of much more limited application. The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which this Report is concerned arise in a process initiated by government for the achievement of basic governmental purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has as one of its consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the persons proceeded against.... When government chooses to exert its powers in the criminal area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking reasonable measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just administration of the law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While government may not be required to relieve the accused of his povcriticized the cases decided "under the Betts-Bute formula," Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) , as "distinguished neither by the consistency of their results nor by the cogency of their argument." Allen, supra, at 230.
The Gideon Court might also have referred to Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 191, 197 (1958) , where Allen assailed the distinction the Court had drawn between capital cases (where a "flat requirement" of appointed counsel was recognized) and noncapital felony cases (where an indigent defendant had to establish that the absence of counsel deprived him of a "fair trial") as "lack[ing] integrity." For "the important consideration seems less the penalties that may be imposed than the need for skilled representation," and "most murder cases, in which capital penalties are involved, are by no means the most difficult to try or those in which representation is most urgently required." The seeds of the Allen Report may be found in the 1958 Wayne Law Review article's discussion of the meaning and scope of "equal justice," id. at 198-200; see also Allen, Book Review, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 779, 780-81 (1957 78 (1963) , for not applying the newly established Gideon principle to any misdemeanor case: "Society has no duty to go that far. A man may have a right to dental care at state expense, but not to gold inlays." erty, it may properly be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of justice.
The Committee, therefore, conceives the obligation of government less as an undertaking to eliminate "discrimination" against a class of accused persons and more as a broad commitment by government to rid its processes of all influences that tend to defeat the ends a system of justice is intended to serve....
•.. The adversary system is the institution devised by our legal order for the proper reconciliation of public and private interests in the crucial areas of penal regulation. As such, it makes essential and invaluable contributions to the maintenance of the free society.
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values which it advances depends upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process. The proper performance of the defense function is thus as vital to the health of the system as the performance of the prosecuting and adjudicatory functions. It follows that insofar as the financial status of the accused impedes vigorous and proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of the adversary system. We believe that the system is imperiled by the large numbers of accused persons unable to employ counsel or to meet even modest bail requirements and by the large, but indeterminate, numbers of persons, able to pay some part of the costs of defense, but unable to finance a full and proper defense. 5 The Report of the Attorney General's Committee was hardly Allen's only contribution to the improvement of justice. Although Allen has many friends and admirers on the bench and in government service and private practice, he has even more in academia. This is hardly surprising. To begin with, in the course of nearly four decades of teaching, he has graced the law faculties of five universities (in chronological order, Northwestern, Harvard, the Uni-5. ALLEN REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10. 6. Moreover, Allen's contributions to the administration ofiustice came not only through his writings. See, for example, Robert Burt's account elsewhere in this issue of Allen's representation of a person committed to a mental institution under what turned out to be an unconstitutional statute. Burt, What Frank Allen Teaches, 85 MiCH. L. REv. 391 (1986).
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HeinOnline --85 Mich. L. Rev. 408 1986-1987 versity of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and now the University of Florida). In addition, he has served as President of the Association of American Law Schools and of the National Order of the Coif. Moreover, Allen enjoys visiting and speaking at other law schools, and because of his renown as a scholar and his prowess as a speaker he has had no shortage of opportunities to do so. Indeed, I venture to say that there are not ten law professors in this century who have delivered as many endowed lectures (or as many of the most prestigious ones). At this writing, he is about to give his twelfth.
7
As already indicated, Allen cares a good deal about the larger world outside the classroom and the library, but he also cares deeply about liberal and professional education (as evidenced by his many thoughtful speeches and essays on the subject). 8 His interest in legal education was no doubt whetted by his service as dean of the University of Michigan Law School from 1965 to 1971, a time of unprecedented student unrest and a time when Allen's civility, patience, wisdom, and large capacity for fairness stood him in good stead. 9 Allen considers "[tihe preservation and extension of an intellectually based and humanistically motivated legal education ... the greatest challenge facing American law schools." 10 "What we have to fear," he warns us, "is a narrowing of minds and concerns" -a "lower [ing] [of] aspirations for intellectual quality and service to the larger society."' 1 He continues:proves is that a person is not likely to be a good political economist who is nothing else." For the phrase "good political economist" let the sentence read "good lawyer."'
12
As anyone familiar with Allen's work will testify, he himself is a product of the kind of "intellectually based and humanistically motivated legal education" he seeks to preserve and to extend. He is that rare individual who "possess[es] both culture and expert knowledge in some special direction" and is thus well equipped to explore the problems within his area of expertise with intensity and in breadth.' 3 Actually, Allen has expert knowledge in a number of "special directions" (juvenile justice, criminology, criminal corrections, legal education, and various aspects of substantive criminal law, Constitutional law, and family law). In this brief tribute, however, I shall dwell on only one of his areas of expertise, the one I know best -criminal procedure.
As far as criminal procedure is concerned, Frank Allen was the right person at the right time. In his first year of teaching, the Court handed down the famous case of Wolf v. Colorado. 14 The Court held that the protection against unreasonable search and seizure was "basic to a free society" and thus "enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause."' 15 But it went on to say that the sanction applied in federal prosecutions -exclusion of the evidence obtained in violation of the right -was not binding on the states. 16 Although it was to be overruled a decade later, 17 . We would then be faced with the problem of the respect to be accorded the legislative judgment on an issue as to which, in default of that judgment, we have been forced to depend upon our own. 338 U.S. at 33.
Twenty-five years ago, Allen assured us that the suggestion in Wolf that the exclusionary rule is but a judicially created rule of evidence that Congress might negate "does not survive the Mapp decision." Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: 4 Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 24. But ways of thinking about the fourth amendment exclusionary rule have changed. Now that the rule rests on an "empirical proposition" rather than a "principled basis," cf. note 18 supra; now that application of the rule "presents a question not of rights, but of remedies," a question to be answered by weighing the "potential injury" caused by the rule against its "potential benefits," United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349, 354 (1974) ; and now that, on the basis of that "cost-benefit analysis," the Court has finally carved out a "good faith" (actually a "reasonable mistake") exception to the rule in its central application, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the rule seems especially vulnerable to "legislative repeal," most likely "replacement" by legislation that provides what we shall be assured is an "effective" tort remedy.
27. 338 U.S. at 32-33.
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HeinOnline --85 Mich. L. Rev. 412 1986-1987 a more effective check on abuse by police under the domination of a powerful local political machine seems hardly founded on empirical evidence. Such evidence as is available forms little basis for sanguine hopes as to the effectiveness of public opinion, without more, in checking police abuse at the local level [citing various reports, books and articles]. Again it should be noted, in no other area in the civil liberties cases has the Court felt justified in trusting to public protest for protection of basic personal rights. Indeed, since the rights of privacy are usually asserted by those charged with crime and since the demands of efficient law enforcement are so insistent, it would seem that reliance on public opinion in these cases can be less justified than in almost any other .... 28
Why did the Wolf Court place so much reliance on "other methods" of enforcing the protection against unreasonable search and seizure but in three confession cases decided the same day reject as constitutionally irrelevant state reliance on such other means of protection (e.g., tort actions, criminal prosecutions, and internal police discipline) against unconstitutional interrogation practices? 29 The Wolf opinion is conspicuous for its failure to reconcile the search and seizure cases with those involving inadmissible confessions. Indeed, the Wolf opinion does not even allude to the confession cases. But they pervade Allen's classic article on WolfAny basic consideration of unreasonable search and seizure soon identifies it as an integral part of a broader problem. The third degree, the unlawful arrest, the official invasion of individual privacy each represent abuses of the public force by officers charged with enforcement of the law -abuses which must be controlled if values that have been thought to be of importance are to be maintained. Each springs from common motivations and common impulses. Attempts to treat any single species of such abuse as isolated and unrelated phenomena are likely to produce partial and unsatisfactory results. Consistency of approach to problems so intimately related would seem to be a matter of considerable importance. 30 Justification of the exclusion of "coerced" confessions on the ground of the untrustworthiness of such evidence has frequently been made....
[But the] concept of due process as it has developed in the latter-day confession cases is clearly based upon considerations which go beyond a concern that the defendant in the particular case shall not be convicted on unreliable and untrustworthy evidence. This expansion of constitu-28. Allen, supra note 25, at 12-13. 29. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) . The three confession cases decided the same day as Wolf cannot be distinguished on the ground that they involved the admissibility of unreliable evidence. For the state courts had allowed into evidence independently corroborated and hence trustworthy, albeit "involuntary," confessions.
30. Allen, supra note 25, at 25. tional doctrine, while probably incapable of explanation in terms of any single factor, seems to have been motivated in principal part by a deepseated judicial suspicion of law-enforcement procedures which require the holding of suspects in secret police custody for extended periods of time ....
•.. [C] learly [in the confession cases arising from the state courts], the Court under the limitations of the due process clause has been seeking to strike down police procedures which in their general application appear to the prevailing justices as imperiling basic individual immunities. Clearly, also, the Court has not construed the obligations of federalism as precluding such an effort even though the results... have been obviously at odds with local conceptions of proper police behavior.
But insofar as many of such considerations continue to be deemed relevant to the problem of the admissibility of [confessions] in state criminal proceedings, it becomes progressively more difficult to distinguish the problem of the admission of evidence seized in violation of individual rights of privacy. For in the latter as in the former situation the Court is dealing with police practices which in their general operation are destructive of basic individual rights. It would seem that the perils to an "accusatorial" system of criminal justice in the use of evidence illegally seized from the privacy of the defendant's home may be quite as real as those arising from the use of evidence extracted from the lips of a suspect following a period of prolonged interrogation in secret police custody. In both situations the perils arise primarily out of the procedures employed to acquire the evidence rather than from dangers of the incompetency of the evidence so acquired. Furthermore, if the demands of federalism are not such as deny to the Court power to supervise the interrogatory practices of state police officers in the interest of procedures most likely to preserve the integrity of basic individual immunities, such supervision of police practices in the interest of preserving basic rights of privacy seems likewise justifiable. Yet the consequence of the decision of the Court in the Wolf case is rigidly to separate the two problems and to create a dubious double standard in the definition of the requirements of due process as they relate to state criminal proceedings.
3 '
When, five years after it had declined to impose the exclusionary rule on the states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process, the Court upheld the admissibility of the evidence in Irvine v. California, 32 the Wolf doctrine appeared to be more firmly imbedded in the law than when first promulgated. For the police conduct challenged in Irvine was "almost incredible": "That officers of the law would break and enter a home, [install a concealed microphone], even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversations of the occupants for over a month would be almost incredible if it were not admitted. ' The author of Wolf dissented in Irvine, insisting that Wolf was distinguishable:
[W]hat is decisive here.., is additional aggravating conduct which the Court finds repulsive.
...
Surely the Court does not propose to announce a new absolute, namely, that even the most reprehensible means for securing a conviction will not taint a verdict so long as the body of the accused was not touched by State officials. 34 But Justice Jackson, who wrote the principal opinion in Irvine, declined "to make inroads upon Wolf by holding that it applies only to searches and seizures which produce on our minds a mild shock, while if the shock is more serious, the states must exclude the evidence. As Jackson saw it, the search involved in Wolf "was offensive to the law in the same respect, if not the same degree, as here." '36 Irvine seemed to be a dramatic example of "[t]he tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limits of its logic." ' 37 But sometimes a principle is never so vulnerable as when it is so expanded:
The Irvine case is of critical importance in the history of the Wolf doctrine. It expressed the most stringent view of the limitations on federal judicial power associated with that doctrine. At the same time, it probably contributed more to the ultimate downfall of Wolf than any other holding of the Court.
38
The result in the 39. Id. at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
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HeinOnline --85 Mich. L. Rev. 415 1986-1987 even when among the first on the subject to appear in print, strikes one as "the sober second thought." 4 His criticism can be quite powerful, but his prose is measured and restrained. And his treatment of an issue, however explosive, is evenhanded and openminded.
Allen is sometimes disheartened, 4 1 on rare occasions even taken aback, 42 but never outraged. In the twenty years we were colleagues at the University of Michigan I came to know him well. And one who reads the work of a person he knows well can hear his voice, even see the expression on his face. At times Allen raises his eyebrows, but never his voice.
In criticizing Wolf he expressed no anger. In commenting, a decade later, on the case that overruled Wolf he showed no elation.
Indeed, his response to the overruling of Wolf was quite subdued:
That the Court's action will be extravagantly praised and extravagantly condemned seems entirely predictable. Both reactions are entitled to be met with some skepticism. The Mapp holding will force a period of painful adjustment and accommodation in many states. There is no reason to believe, however, that the accommodation cannot be made or that, in making it, state and local law enforcement will be rendered incapable of performing its essential functions. On the other hand, The problem here is not that of releasing an obviously guilty defendant because of the system's failure to respect his rights. On the contrary, the problem is one of convicting the innocent. Studies reveal that misidentification may well be the greatest peril confronting the innocent person caught up in the criminal process. Whatever the values of the right to counsel in these procedures -and opinions differ -no one is likely to regard it as a sufficient solution to these problems. Alternative devices, possibly including the removal of identification procedures entirely from the police and placing them in the hands of an expert and neutral administrative agency, are required. Congress' rejection of the Court's solution is not surprising. The fact that it contented itself with simply attempting a legislative repeal of the Court's decision without offering anything to deal with the critical problem the Court had identified is deplorable. 398 (1975) , to the assertion in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.), that "if the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial, the 'imperative of judicial integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence" of materials seized in ways later found to violate the fourth amendment:
[Tihere will be many who feel that Justice Rehnquist's version of the "imperative of judicial integrity" trivializes the concept. Undoubtedly, conscious wrongdoing by the police is a source of aggravation. But even if the police were unaware of the illegality, the judges are not. And it is the admission of evidence known byjudges to have been obtained in violation of constitutional right that gives rise to the ethical concern expressed in the phrase, the "imperative of judicial integrity."
[Vol. 85:406 one may doubt that the holding makes as substantial a contribution to the protection of individual rights as the majority of the Court appears to assume. This is true, in part, because the exclusionary rule is based on a theory of the causes of police misconduct that is partial and unsatisfactory. The fact remains that the administration of criminal justice is primarily a function of the local government. The causes for abuses of the function must be sought in the pathologies of local government, and elimination of these ills must be accomplished primarily at the local level.
43
It is no exaggeration to say, as one commentator did, that Frank Allen "anticipated virtually every argument [for extending the federal exclusionary rule to the states] advanced by the Court in Mapp v. Ohio" 44 (at least every persuasive one). Nevertheless, Allen did not spare the "opinion of the Court ' 45 overruling Wolf. In declining to impose the exclusionary rule on the states, the Wolf Court, per Frankfurter, J., had regarded the widespread rejection of the rule by the states as highly significant in defining the requirements of the due process clause. 46 In response, the Mapp Court, per Clark, J., picked up on a point the Court had made a year earlier when it had called the movement in the states toward the exclusionary rule "halting but seemingly inexorable." 47 "While in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule," reported Justice Clark, now "more than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the [exclusionary] rule. Significantly, among those now following the rule is California "48
Despite his unhappiness with Wolf, Allen found it "difficult to believe" that this particular argument for overturning that landmark case "convinced any but the already persuaded." 49 Nor, although the California Supreme Court had relied heavily on Allen's own writings in adopting the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law, 50 attach great significance to the "conversion of California":
[I]f evidence of reluctance on the part of the states to accept the exclusionary rule is deemed "basically relevant" to disposition of the constitutional question, it can hardly be denied that the evidence is still strong; and this is so even though the obduracy of New York is now balanced by the conversion of California. Moreover, it is far from clear which way the argument cuts. For, after all, the "seemingly inexorable" drift toward the exclusionary rule occurred under the regime not only of Wolf but of Wolf as interpreted by Irvine. Assuming that general acceptance of the exclusionary rule is the consummation to be desired, might not the trend have been permitted to continue? The substantial attainment of the objective through local volition might appear to have particular attractions for a political system that presumably attaches more than verbal significance to the values of local self-determination. Indeed, the point can fairly be made that the clearest achievements of the Court in raising the standards of state criminal procedures.., have occurred precisely in those situations in which the supervision of the Court has induced such constructive local response. Even if it were felt that additional stimulus was required, the result in Mapp does not appear inevitable. The overruling of Irvine, rather than of Wolf v. Colorado, might well have induced a movement toward the exclusionary rule no less "inexorable," yet less "halting.1 51 Allen's evenhandedness and openmindedness is also evidenced by his response to the Mapp Court's reliance on the coerced confession cases. One of the grounds the Mapp Court advanced for holding that "the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege," '52 namely, the exclusionary rule, was essentially the point Allen had made in his 1950 article:
[W]e are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning the enforcement of any other basic constitutional right .... This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it does against the Federal Government... the right not to be convicted by use of a coerced confession, however logically relevant it be, and without regard to its reliability. And nothing could be more certain than that when a coerced confession is involved, "the relevant rules of evidence" are overridden . The calm judgment, fairmindedness, and farsightedness that Allen demonstrated in his studies of the Wolf and Mapp cases are characteristic of all his writing on criminal procedure -a field not overpopulated by those who "turn up their collars against windy sloganeering, no matter from which direction it is blown." 54. Allen, supra note 38, at 31-32 (footnotes omitted). Whether or not Allen so intended, his observations provide some support for the kind of "good faith" modification of the exclusionary rule the Court was to adopt more than twenty years later in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), briefly discussed in note 26 supra. Moreover, so long as the exclusionary rule is binding on the states and so long as the fourth amendment applies to the states in all its rigor, Allen's observations -again, whether or not they were so intended -suggest the need for and desirability of a less demanding "probable cause" test, the kind of "practical, common-sense" "flexible, easily applied" something less than more-probable-than-not standard the Court was to embrace in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). dealt satisfactorily with the serious problems raised by secret police interrogation 56 and that "the whole modem history of the confession rule... has been characterized by ambiguity as to what purposes the rule is intended to achieve and what interests it is designed to protect." '57 But long before Escobedo 58 and Miranda 59 -indeed, a year before Earl Warren was named Chief Justice -Allen warned:
[I]t is clear that further expansions of the confession rule are likely to come in conflict with police practices regarded by virtually all law enforcement officials as necessary and legitimate. Furthermore, insofar as these practices do not involve violence or other methods.., calculated to induce an innocent man to confess falsely, the attitude of the police is likely to be supported by a considerable segment of public opinion.
Resistance and practical nullification of the Court's efforts may be expected to follow .... 60 This same foresight characterized Allen's early work on indigent criminal defendants. However surprising it may seem today, when first handed down thirty years ago Griffin v. Illinois, 6 1 holding that all indigent felony defendants must be furnished a trial transcript at state expense if such a transcript is necessary to effectuate appellate review, "produced much disquiet and criticism throughout the country. ' 62 But Allen maintained, quite correctly, that Griffin "is squarely i. the main current of an important development... [that] has been steadily unfolding for a generation and more." ' 63 Moreover, he added, again quite correctly, that Griffin "hardly scratches the surface." 60. Allen, supra note 56, at 34 (footnote omitted). "If the problem cannot be solved through indefinite expansion of the confession rule," added Allen, "it is a problem which must be solved in other ways." Id. at 34-35. He suggested, inter alia, "acceptance of some variant of the recommendations of the Wickersham Commission calling for public interrogation of suspects by a magistrate after arraignment and the admissibility of answers to those questions as evidence against the defendant." Id. at 35. In this regard, see W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 76-81 (1967) In the decade and a half following Griffin, its underlying principle was broadly applied. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) , viewed denial of counsel to an indigent appellant as "a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin," and Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), carried the Griffin principle further than the Court ever carried the Gideon principle by holding that an indigent appellant cannot be denied a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of his claims even though he was convicted of ordinance [Vol. 85: 406 Allen recognized, however, that one difficulty with the rationale that justice cannot turn on the amount of money a defendant has is that "it contains no very obvious limiting principle. ' 65 He suggested an analysis that "sounds more in 'due process' than in 'equal protection' "66 -an analysis the present Court now seems to be utilizing. 67 Allen's intellectual rigor and distaste for overstatement and oversimplification is evidenced more generally by his views on the Warren and Burger Courts -and by his reaction to other commentaviolations punishable by fine only. More generally, a number of cases seemed to read Griffin for the proposition that an indigent defendant must be furnished any valuable or useful "tool" or "instrument" available for a price to others. The Grffin-Douglas "equality principle" was finally given a grudging reading in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (also discussed in note 67 infra), which declined to recognize a constitutional right to appointed counsel for discretionary review by a state supreme court. But a decade later, the Court broke its thirty-year silence on the issue of an indigent defendant's right to a psychiatrist and other expert assistance and held that, at least when an indigent defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the state must provide the assistance of a psychiatrist for his defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) . (1974) , is that the majority's so-called "equal protection analysis" really amounts to a "due process analysis":
[The Ross] "equal protection" analysis ... seems to put to one side the admitted fact that an indigent seeking discretionary review is "somewhat handicapped in comparison with a wealthy defendant who has counsel assisting him" and focuses instead on whether an indigent seeking discretionary review without counsel has a "meaningful opportunity" (emphasis added Post-Ross cases confirm the Court's tendency to rely on due process rather than on equal protection analysis in ascertaining the constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants. Thus, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985) , the Court reaffirmed the need for the state to take steps to assure that an indigent defendant has "a fair opportunity" or "an adequate opportunity" to present his defense. tors' views of these Courts. Allen had no particular affection for the Burger Court, but he was even less fond of those critics of that Court whose work "take[s] on angry and apocalyptic tones." ' 68 He considered "the Burger Court, even in the criminal cases... a more complex phenomenon than often represented by its critics." '69 He did not deny that "the values given priority by a majority of the present Court diverge drastically from those expressed in the Warren years." ' 70 Nonethelessit is well to recall that many of the most distinctive tendencies of the Burger Court had their origins in the closing years of Earl Warren's tenure when the country was oppressed by fear of the possible collapse of public order. That the Burger Court frequently fails to reach acceptable levels of craftsmanship, skimps the hard tasks of rational persuasion, and is obsessed with achieving certain policy objectives, seems demonstrable.
But these sins were not invented by the Burger Court. Moreover, and more fundamentallyWhat our recent experience does again demonstrate is the danger of relying so heavily as we have in the past upon the Supreme Court as the instrumentality to achieve efficiency and decency in the administration of American criminal justice. Many of those most appalled by ... the Burger Court have shirked the battle in the political and legislative arena. However difficult the conflict may prove to be, it is there that a large share of the effort must be expended in the years immediately ahead. In the meantime... [o] ne hopes that the criticism [of the Burger Court] will be both rational and reasonably temperate, for extravagance of language can threaten the long-term vitality of the institution. This would be unfortunate, for we may need the Court again some day. 72 Allen must have welcomed much of the Warren Court's so-called "revolution" in American criminal procedure. After all, a large part of that Court's work "consisted of its efforts to revitalize the adversary process in those parts of the system in which it was always supposed to flourish." ' 73 More generally, that Court sought to reshape American criminal justice "in the interest of a larger realization of the constitutional ideal of liberty under the law." 74 NeverthelessIt is important... not to canonize the Warren Court and not to regard its works as sacrosanct. It was often wrong and wrongheaded. It frequently failed to articulate its decisions adequately and sometimes appeared to doubt the importance of adequate articulation. It was frequently self-righteous and intolerant of competing considerations. At times [as in the Mapp case, when it overruled Wolf even though the latter case was not cited in the appellant's brief] it flouted the Court conventions when adherence to them would have cost little and might have marshalled greater support for the innovations it was effecting. Strangely enough, one of the most serious criticisms of the Court is that often, having embarked upon a problem it did not go far enough. This was true not only in Miranda. The Warren Court failed to realize its opportunity to place the law of entrapment on a more satisfactory footing .... Having struggled its way to a new and more useful approach to [what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment] in Katz v. United States, it failed to pursue the implications of its insight. Sometimes its conflicting motivations appeared paradoxical. In the same period that it was pursuing innovations in the area of pretrial interrogation that many warned were threatening the effectiveness of law enforcement, it stubbornly defended in the name of law enforcement the use of undercover agents and resisted efforts to restrict and regulate their activities. 75 "The central problem of the Warren Court's activism," as Allen saw it, was "not that it threatened serious abuses of power by politically irresponsible judges."
'7 6 Ratherit was simply that, despite the Court's ingenious, persistent, and, some may feel, heroic efforts to overcome the inherent limitations of judicial power, the Court attempted more than it could possibly achieve. Moreover, the attempt incurred costs. The Court was unable to see the problems of criminal justice in their full complexity. While concentrating on the vindication of individual rights, the Court was unable to offer any contributions to the staggering problems created for the system of criminal justice by the weight of numbers -both numbers of crimes and numbers of persons processed by the system. Indeed, much of what it did exacerbated those problems. 77 But Allen has little doubt that, whatever the shortcomings in its work and whatever the diversions or retreats from its precedents by future Courts, the influence of the Warren Court will long endure:
By reason of what the Warren Court said and did, we now perceive as problems what too often were not seen as problems before. This is the dynamic of change, and that fact may well be more significant than many of the solutions proposed by the Warren Court. The critique of American criminal justice implicit in the opinions of the Warren era was essentially ethical. Barring cataclysmic upheavals in American life even more devastating than those we anticipate, one expects this ethical insight to persist and to provide guidance in the years ahead. As his masterly studies of the Wolf, Mapp, and Griffin cases amply demonstrate, Allen can dissect cases with meticulous care and great insight. But he can also place an important development in the sweep of history. He is, to borrow a phrase, master of the telescope as well as the microscope. Perhaps it is worth noting that the decision of the Powell case and the rise of Hitler to power in Germany occurred within the period of a single year. It would, of course, be facile and specious to suggest that the two occurrences are related by any direct causal connection. Yet, perhaps, in some larger sense the two events may be located in the same current of history. Both occurrences are encompassed in the crisis of individual liberty which has confronted the western world since the first world war. The Court has been sensitive to the crisis and has responded emphatically to it. It is not only in the state criminal cases that constitutional doctrine has expanded at a remarkable rate. Virtually all of the law of free speech, assembly and press, for example, has been articulated in the last forty years ....
[I]t is apparent that the Court has seen the state criminal cases as one aspect of the modern problem of individual liberty. What the Court has done can only be understood in this light. The search for "civilized standards" of criminal procedure is quite apparently related to the conviction that the distinguishing feature of the free society is less its immediate objectives and more the methods by which those objectives are attained. But surely the most fundamental reasons for the Court's loss of impetus lies in the social and political context of the Court in the late 1960's. That period was a time of social upheaval, violence in the ghettos, and disorder on the campuses. Fears of the breakdown of public order were widespread. Inevitably, the issue of law and order were politically exploited. In the presidential campaign of 1968 the bewildering problems of crime in the United States were represented simply as a war between the "peace forces" and the "criminal forces." The decision in Miranda evoked a chorus of criticism of the Court, ranging from the excited to the psychotic. Congress responded with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, some provisions of which were obviously retaliatory. These events combined to create an atmosphere that, to say the least, was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the Warren Court's mission in criminal cases. 85 Only recently, Allen viewed current American attitudes on capital punishment as "part of a larger social current":
The suddenness and magnitude of the shift [toward increasing public support for the death penalty] ... in the past decade and a half is rivaled only by a similarly precipitous loss of faith in penal rehabilitationism as the guiding ideal and objective of American criminal justice. Few will doubt that the two are related phenomena. those of the man or woman in the street, are in significant part products of the ethos of the times, of the zeitgeist. 87 We appear to be passing through a time in which, because of frustration and disappointments, we are increasingly inclined to rely on the launching of deadly force as a principal means for eliminating our various dissatisfactions. Such has surely been the recent trend of our external policy, as it also has been of our penal policy. Given the cyclical nature of such movements of mood and attitudes in our history, one may be justified in assuming that the time will come when we shall be sated with the uses of deadly force and may again be permitted to consider more moderate means. Nothing in the advance sheets, however, suggests when that time may arrive. 88 A final word about Frank Allen. I cannot think very long about his nearly forty years of teaching, writing, and service in various good causes without recalling an article on legal education written by his one-time colleague, Brainerd Currie. If the law schools' aspirations are attainable at all, wrote Professor Currie, the way is not through formal arrangements alone, "but through concentration on... an 'indefinable fundamental.' "89 He continued:
As the expression confesses, I do not know quite what [an "indefinable fundamental"] means. I believe it means, for one thing, that training for professional responsibility and for awareness of the role of law in society is not a matter that can be parceled out and assigned to certain members of the faculty at certain hours, but is the job of all law teachers all of the time. It means that we should be less concerned with seeking new things to do than with doing better the things we already do fairly well. It means that we should confront, and bring our students to confront, the most explosive problems with which law may deal, facing all the facts and plumbing all the issues to their full depth without fear or prejudice. It means that each law teacher should joyfully accept with Holmes the challenge that in his work he may "wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup of heroism, may wear his heart out after the unattainable." 9 0 87. Id. at 321. 88. Id. at 323 (footnote omitted). In preparing for this article, Allen read some two thousand advance sheets in criminal cases -on the chance "they may have important things to say about the condition and prospects of American society." Id. at 312. Allen contended, as he had on other occasions, that "law can serve as a path to the world. 
